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Universidad EAFIT

Economía · 2025

El dilema de la inacción : riesgos económicos y estrategia en el cambio climático

This research analyzes the economic incentives that influence international cooperation in response to climate change, using a dynamic game theory model. Through an infinitely repeated game, the strategies of four key actors—United States, China, the European Union, and a coalition of middle-income countries—are evaluated across three rounds (2030, 2040, 2050), incorporating empirical data on GDP, CO₂ emissions, and climate-related costs. The results reveal that although non-cooperation initially prevails, the growing economic impacts of global warming create inflection points where collective action becomes inevitable. This study contributes to the literature by overcoming the limitations of static models, proposing a framework that integrates both asymmetries between countries and temporal dynamics. Furthermore, it incorporates monetary values into the utility function to enable a more realistic and policy-relevant analysis.

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