Economía · 2026
Riesgo moral del prestador bajo pago por evento en el régimen subsidiado de salud colombiano : un modelo de interacción estratégica entre IPS y EPS-S
Record only. The repository marks this work as “Acceso abierto”: the PDF is not public, so there is no text to read here. View the record in the repository.
Abstract
This study analyzes how the fee-for-service payment model in Colombia’s subsidized health regime may generate moral hazard incentives on the part of providers, within a bilateral relationship in which the provider (IPS) has better information about the patient’s true severity, while the subsidized insurer (EPS-S) only observes the submitted claim and not the actual clinical condition. At the same time, the EPS-S also plays a role in the strategic interaction, as it may choose either to recognize the claim under ordinary review or to dispute it through claim denial and audit procedures. The study adopts a quantitative approach grounded in economic modeling. To this end, it develops an extensive-form game with chance and imperfect information to represent the strategic interaction between insurer and provider. The model incorporates expected payoffs, auditing costs, dispute costs, and the probability of effective detection in order to identify the conditions under which opportunistic claim intensification becomes convenient and those under which claim denial operates as a credible threat. The contribution of the study is to show that, under fee-for-service, the tension between IPS and EPS-S can be understood as a problem of incentives and control under imperfect information, with implications for the institutional design of the subsidized regime.